This paper presents new evidence of asymmetric pass-through, the notion that upward cost shocks are passed through faster than downward cost shocks, in U.S. gasoline prices. Much of the extant literature comes to seemingly contradictory conclusions about the existence of an asymmetry, though the differences may be due to different aggregation (both over time and geographic markets) and the use of different price series including crude oil, wholesale, and retail gasoline prices. I utilize a large and detailed dataset to determine where evidence of a pass-through asymmetry exists, and how it depends on the aggregation and price series chosen by the researcher.
Introduction
There is a large literature analyzing the cost to price pass-through in industries ranging from automobiles (Gron and Swenson (1982) ), to cheese products (Kim and Cotterill (2008) ), to the beef industry (Goodwin and Holt (1999) ). The literature has not only focused on the ability of firms to successfully capture rents when input costs change, but also on how the rate of pass-through varies when the costs increase versus decrease.
In the gasoline industry, this asymmetric phenomenon is known as rockets and feathers, reflecting the fact that retail prices tend to increase quickly when costs (say, wholesale gasoline prices) rise, but drift down slowly when they fall.
1 Much of the extant literature comes to seemingly contradictory conclusions about the existence of this phenomenon, though the differences may be due to different data sources, price series, aggregation over time and across geographic areas, as well as misspecified models. In this paper, I re-examine the pass-through in gasoline prices using a detailed dataset available at a high frequency, across many cities, and at several price levels in the vertical distribution process for gasoline.
The gasoline industry has been the focus of a particularly large amount of research on pass-through for several reasons. Gasoline is a fairly homogeneous product and both retail and intermediate wholesale prices are relatively transparent compared with other industries. 2 Much of the variation in gasoline prices is driven by the price of crude oil, the key input into gasoline. 3 This crude oil is traded on a world market and the price is also transparent to market players and to consumers. In spite of this, there are 1 The production and distribution of gasoline is just one part of the petroleum industry, which produces a whole range of refined products. The rockets and feathers literature has focused primarily on gasoline prices.
2 Rack prices for wholesale gasoline are observable and in 2009, refiner rack sales accounted for 60% of the total gasoline supplied in the US. See http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_cons_refmg_c_ nus_epm0_mgalpd_a.htm and http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_cons_psup_dc_nus_mbbl_ m.htm. The rest is sold to lessee-dealer stations at (unobserved) dealer-tank-wagon (DTW) prices and via transfer prices to refiner-operated stations. dynamics present in the gasoline industry which are difficult to explain with competitive or oligopolistic economic models.
The literature on rockets and feathers dates back to at least 1991 when Robert Bacon found evidence of an asymmetric response in gasoline prices in the UK. Since that time, others have found evidence of the phenomenon including Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997, hereafter BCG), Lewis (forthcoming), Ye et. al. (2005) , and most recently, Deltas (2008) . These studies all utilize some form of an error correction model (outlined below) and consider some combination of crude oil prices, wholesale prices (rack or spot), and retail gasoline prices. They also vary by the geography they consider and how the data are aggregated over time (i.e., daily, weekly, or monthly). There are also several papers that, due to either a different data source or model, find no evidence of an asymmetric price response including Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) and Godby (2000) .
The former paper also tests BCG results using daily data; however they only focus on the transmission of crude oil to spot gasoline prices. This paper is similar to BCG in that I analyze several different prices (crude oil, spot gasoline, rack, and retail prices) over a long period of time. However, unlike BCG who use weekly and bi-weekly data from the Lundberg Survey, I have access to daily data on all prices. I also avoid a modeling assumption by BCG (discussed below) which was questioned by Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) and instead use a more standard approach.
If it exists, there is little consensus on what causes the asymmetric response, though explanations range from consumer search costs, to explicit or implicit collusion, to inventory management by consumers. Deltas, for example, looks at how the asymmetric response varies with the level of retail market power and finds more asymmetry in markets with relatively more retail market power. 4 Lewis (forthcoming) and others posit 4 Market power is proxied by the average markup observed in the market over his sample period. It is tempting to assume that markets in which firms face less competition will feature firms quickly passing on cost increases to consumers, and only slowly (or possibly never) passing on cost savings. Markets with many competing firms should feature perfect pass-through. For industry-wide cost changes, this is generally true, however the opposite results when the cost change is firm-specific. Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) show that firm-specific cost changes are more completely passed through the less competitive is that consumer search behavior could be causing the asymmetric response. If consumers are more likely to search for a low price when prices are expected to rise, then competition will be fierce when costs are rising and margins tight. However, if prices are falling, consumers may search less and this provides retailers with short-term market power and allows them to slowly lower prices and increase their margins. If this is the case, it still does not explain why asymmetric adjustment varies across time or across different geographic areas.
Asymmetric adjustment of downstream prices to changes in an upstream cost (such as a wholesale price) is generally divided into two forms: amount asymmetry and pattern asymmetry. Amount asymmetry occurs when the aggregate change over a period of time is different when costs are rising versus when they are falling. This asymmetry is not the focus of most studies because it would imply that the upstream and downstream prices would diverge over time, which is not the case with gasoline prices. Pattern asymmetry involves differences in the relative speed of pass-through. As an example, one may find evidence of pattern asymmetry if a 10% increase in wholesale prices leads to a 10% increase in retail prices after one week, but an equivalent decrease in wholesale prices leads to only a 5% decline in retail prices after one week. Consistent with the literature, I will focus my analysis on pattern asymmetry.
In this study, I look for pattern asymmetry in pass-through, and I vary the geography, the time aggregation, and products considered. I find the strongest evidence of pattern asymmetry in the rack to retail prices at both the city and national level. On average, retail prices rise more than four times as fast as they fall. Branded gasoline features significantly more asymmetry compared with unbranded gasoline.
Asymmetry varies significantly from year to year and across cities. For example, while in Los Angeles, the asymmetry of branded rack to retail price changes is fairly the market. (See also, Ten Kate and Niels (2005) .) The reason is that when faced with a cost decrease, say, firms with a greater market share will benefit relatively more from the increase in quantity demanded which more than offsets the lower revenue from passing on the cost decrease in the form of lower prices. Using weekly instead of daily data, tends to attenuate the evidence of asymmetry in some cases, though increases it in others.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I outline the model that I employ and specification tests that need to be run to justify its use. I discuss the data and provide basic descriptive statistics in section 3 and present the results of my model in section 4, including asymmetric pass-through results for different geographic areas, at different levels of time aggregation, and for different products. In section 5, I conclude and provide a brief outline of a complementary paper which seeks to explain why pass-through rates and asymmetry vary by city and over time.
Model
I estimate an error correction model (ECM) frequently used in the literature, though in various forms (e.g., Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) ). I estimate two versions of the model: one which is run individually for each city (metro area) 5 and the other is a national-level model with fixed effects included for each city, which allows for different markups in each city. 6 The latter regression measures the average pass-through rate across all cities, while allowing the long-term relationship to vary by city. I allow for a difference in the pass-through of positive and negative upstream price changes.
While I estimate the model for several pairs of upstream and downstream prices, for simplicity, the following is the rack to retail pass-through model for a given city:
5 Most of the metro areas in my sample are major cities. Some cities near state borders are split across state lines, so for example, Louisville, KY and Louisville, IN are separate metro areas. See figure A.1 for an example. This is important because often different types of gasoline (e.g., conventional, RFG, and California Air Resources Board (CARB) gasoline) are sold in different states.
6 I use the term "national-level," though prices are not aggregated, but instead the specification includes prices from all major cities in my dataset.
. Lag lengths are determined by minimizing the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC):
where K is the number of parameters to be estimated, N is the number of observations, and RSS =ˆ ˆ from equation 1. I could allow the lag lengths to vary separately for positive and negative changes as well as for rack and retail prices. However, since determining the optimal lag lengths for each price series, versus using a fixed (and equal) lag length for all, does not affect the qualitative results, in the analysis below I fix the lag length at 21 days in all regressions. This also allows me to compare regressions across cities and over time since I will utilize the same specification in each.
The expression z t−1 = Retail t−1 − γ 0 − γ 1 Rack t−1 is the error correction term, and it captures the long-run relationship between the upstream and downstream prices. β Following the two-step method proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) , I estimate γ 0 and γ 1 by running OLS on the following equation:
The residuals, z t−1 , are then inserted directly into the model. 7 BGC estimate the longterm relationship in the same step as the rest of the parameters and instrument for the upstream prices to control for possible endogeneity. As outlined in Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) , this may lead to problems with the resulting estimates. 8 Once I obtain the residuals, I can estimate equation 1 by OLS.
The national-level regression is similar, though it includes city-level fixed effects in the error correction term:
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two potential types of asymmetry:
amount and pattern. In terms of the model parameters, amount asymmetry would be of the form:
however, this cannot exist over the long-term since upstream and downstream prices do not tend to drift apart. Pattern asymmetry could be found if any one of the following 7 Since the two series are cointegrated, the OLS regression yields super-consistent estimates of the γ parameters. The estimates can then be inserted into the model as if they were known parameters.
8 BCG run a two-stage least squares regression and instrument for the upstream price with the crude oil price in England and a forward prices of crude in the US. However, while they reject the null that there is no endogeneity in the prices, their 2SLS and OLS estimates are very similar.
three conditions are met:
The asymmetry in equation 6 is the one commonly analyzed in the literature. While the aggregate pass-through should be the same for positive and negative rack price The second pattern asymmetry (noting again that β 3 should be negative reflecting mean-reversion) involves the speed at which relative prices return to their long-term equilibrium levels. We have evidence of the rockets and feathers type of asymmetry if this mean reversion is slower (closer to zero) when retail prices are above their long-term levels and faster (closer to one) when retail prices should be adjusting upwards toward their long-term levels. I use rack prices from OPIS for 20 U.S. cities. These rack prices are for the type of gasoline used in each city since many cities utilize different types of gasoline (conventional, RFG, etc.). In some cases, rack prices for different types of gasoline are reported in the same city. In these cases, I use the rack price that corresponds to the type of gasoline that is used in each retail market area. For example, the Fairfax, VA rack reports both conventional and RFG prices. Since I observe retail data for stations in Finally, I utilize pre-tax retail price data from OPIS for the 27 retail metro areas all within the 20 cities for which I have rack prices. Retail prices are (usually) end of the day prices as they are recorded from the last swipe of a consumer's "fleet-card" on a given day.
10 OPIS averages all the prices they receive each day (at most one from each station) to determine the price for the metro area. After 2001, the prices are reported every day of the week. OPIS samples over 100,000 stations each day and covers branded and unbranded stations. The three most expensive cities for retail gasoline in 2008 were
Miami, San Francisco, and Washington DC. These three cities also featured the highest retail markups over the wholesale price. Given the different reporting times of day for each price series, when running regressions using daily data, it is important that lags are used where appropriate. For example, when considering the speed of pass-through from rack to retail, I can consider the effect for the same time stamp since end of day retail prices have a chance to adjust to a change in the rack price observed at the beginning of the day. However, in the spot to rack pass-through regressions, I use the lagged spot price because these two price series are reported at the same time of day. In table 4, I report statistics on branded versus unbranded rack prices. Generally, unbranded gasoline is more homogeneous across refiners because it includes only a generic package of additives and lacks a brand name premium. Therefore, in most cases, branded gasoline is about 5 cents more expensive than unbranded. However, as evidence in the right-hand column shows, at times the unbranded price actually exceeds the branded price and this happens quite often in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and St. Louis. Many of these inversions follow supply shocks (e.g., hurricanes and refinery outages) as refiners may be giving priority to their branded customers to maintain the brand image, resulting in a more severe supply reduction for unbranded gasoline. Whatever the cause, below I investigate the asymmetric response for branded and unbranded fuel separately.
Data Issues
Before focusing on the results, there are a few issues with the data that need to be 1. Include any day that has data on both the upstream and downstream price.
2. Do not include any date that is missing both the upstream and downstream price.
3. Include a partial observation if it occurs on Monday -Friday, leaving the missing value in the data. Finally, at one time the spot price for RFG was for reformulated gasoline blended with MTBE, which has now been banned in most states. 13 It has been replaced by the RBOB spot price, which is RFG that will eventually get blended with an oxygenate (typically ethanol). In New York and LA, there is some overlap in the two series so I create my complete spot price for RFG as the old RFG spot for the early part of the sample, and as soon as the RBOB spot is available, I switch to that price. The two prices are similar to each other during the overlap period.
14 For the Gulf Coast, there is no overlap (the RFG spot ends on one day and the RBOB spot begins being reported on the very next day) so I concatenate the two series to form my complete RFG spot price. However, the RBOB price on its first day being reported is 38 cents higher than the RFG spot on the previous day. 15 I have done robustness checks by only running the regression using dates where I observe the RFG spot price and the results are very similar.
Results
Before analyzing the results, it is important to test for stationarity of the regressors. I run Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests which show that all price series do indeed have a unit root so first differencing is necessary. I then run another ADF test on each set of price series together and confirm that the upstream and downstream price series are cointegrated (i.e., the residuals from the long-run regression equations 3 and 4 are 12 Removing observations only after lags are formed guarantees that the lagged differences in a given observation are all over approximately the same (small) duration of time. 13 In others, the liability protection has been removed so refiners are reluctant to use it. 14 A simple regression of the RFG spot on the RBOB spot during the overlap yields a slope coefficient of 0.94 for NY and 0.95 for LA. 15 Compared with mean absolute day to day changes for RFG and RBOB of 2.6 and 5.1 cents respectively. 
Price Relationships
I investigate pass-through asymmetry for combinations of the crude oil price, the gasoline spot price, the branded and unbranded rack prices, and the retail price series. The following tables and figures summarize the results of equation 4, which incorporate data from all cities and includes city-level fixed effects in the long-term first-stage regression.
The relationships include the following:
1. Crude oil price to the gasoline spot price, the rack prices, and the retail price. 2. Closest gasoline spot price to the rack prices and the retail price. Complete results for one of these regressions (rack to retail) is shown in table A.1 in the appendix. However, following the literature on asymmetric pass-through, it is much easier to present the results graphically. The reason is that a one-time change in the upstream price will have an immediate effect on the downstream price, but the 16 ADF test statistics on the rack to retail price relationship are all greater than six compared with a 5% critical value of 3.33 from MacKinnon (2010).
17 I estimate the crude to spot relationship for each of the six spot prices available on EIA's website: conventional gasoline and RFG in NY, Houston, and LA.
18 I use the NY spot price for Boston and Newark. I use the LA spot price for LA, San Francisco, Phoenix, Salt Lake City and Seattle. For the rest, I use the Gulf Coast spot price. total effect may be drawn out over a period of days and include both the short-term speed of adjustment (the β 1 terms in equation 1), the own-lag effects (the β 2 terms), and the long-term error correction effects (the β 3 terms). For this reason, I present impulse response functions which trace out the effects of a ten cent per gallon change (positive or negative) in the upstream price on the downstream price over a period of several days following the shock. The 95% confidence bands are also shown in each graph. 
Individual City Results
The evidence of asymmetries found in the previous section is mostly confirmed by regressions run at the individual city level. In table 5, I present results on the difference in the first coefficients on the upstream price for positive and negative changes. Though a complete picture of pass-through asymmetry can only be seen from an impulse response 19 To account for possible nonlinearities in the relationships between the upstream and downstream prices, I consider an upstream price increase from 200 cpg to 210 cpg and a corresponding decrease from 210 cpg to 200 cpg. The results for the rack to retail relationships are similar to above, and the long-term correction asymmetry appears more in the crude to rack and retail price relationships, while it has the opposite sign in spot to rack price regressions.
The type of fuel utilized in each city is also related to the degree of pass-through Calculating the average price in each regime and computing the difference between the two yields the total cost to the consumer of the asymmetric adjustment. I do this analysis for each city and the resulting asymmetry is reported in figure 3 .
Louisville, IN features the largest asymmetry with prices almost 5 cpg higher when they feather down instead of rocket down (even though its speed of adjustment estimate was lower than neighboring Louisville, KY). Other cities, such as, Newark, Cleveland, Salt Lake City, and Washington DC also show relatively more asymmetry, while
Washington WV and Minneapolis WI (both conventional gasoline users) have the least asymmetry. The loss in the unbranded rack to retail asymmetry is smaller in all cities 
Time Aggregation
One of the major differences between the various studies in the extant literature is the frequency of the data used. Many rely on less frequent, bi-weekly or monthly data simply because it it more widely available. In this section, I consider the effect of using daily versus weekly data on the likelihood of finding evidence of pass-through asymmetry. Figure 4 shows the same impulse response function for crude to rack prices, but the top panel uses daily data while the bottom panel uses average weekly prices. While, in general, both show a lack of asymmetry, the time required to reach complete pass-through is about a week in the daily regression and over two weeks in the weekly regression. Important day-to-day variation is being smoothed, which masks the pass-through dynamics The results are similar when considering rack to retail prices in figure 5 . Both impulse response functions show evidence of asymmetry though the pattern of the asymmetry is different. While the asymmetry disappears in ten days in the daily regression, it continues in the weekly regression for about three weeks when pass-through of the negative shock is finally completed.
Branded versus Unbranded
Branded wholesale gasoline is generally a few cents more expensive than unbranded gasoline given the former has proprietary additives (and a brand-name premium) included.
However, at times, the unbranded price will exceed the branded price, and this occurs especially following negative supply shocks. As shown in figure 6 , the (first lag) asymmetry for branded gasoline is significantly higher than for unbranded gasoline in almost every city.
Therefore, while the unbranded price may "rocket up" more quickly than the branded price following a supply shock, the speed at which it retreats back to equilibrium levels is slower for the branded price. In some cities, such as, Seattle and Los Angeles, the difference in asymmetry is very large with branded prices being more than twice as asymmetric compared with unbranded prices. 20 In future work, I will investigate these relationships further, specifically considering how the asymmetric response varies for dayto-day price movements compared with the dynamics following major supply disruptions. 20 The result that unbranded gasoline prices exhibit less asymmetry may be consistent with the literature that claim heterogeneous consumer search costs are the cause of asymmetric adjustment. Consumers who buy branded gasoline are likely more loyal to a single brand, while unbranded buyers are more likely to shop around for the best price. A negative cost shock would be passed on more quickly to unbranded prices than to branded prices, reducing the asymmetry in the unbranded price relationship. 
Formal Tests of Asymmetry
In order to formally test for asymmetry, I report F-statistics for the pattern asymmetry in equation 6. I test the following hypothesis:
Note this is a two-sided test, so includes the possibility that the asymmetry is both the rockets and feather type and the opposite. To implement the test, I save the residual sum of squares, RSS u , from the full (unrestricted) model where the coefficients are allowed to vary separately for positive and negative shocks. I then estimate a symmetric (restricted) model, with only one set of β 1i coefficients and save RSS r . Note that minimizing the BIC separately for each model would mean that a different number of lags is included in each. 21 Therefore, I again restrict the number of lags to be 14 days in both regressions so the only difference between the models is the restriction on the parameters. Formally, the test statistic is of the usual form:
where K u and K r are the number of parameters to be estimated in the unrestricted and daily data to obtain a weekly price series attenuates the findings of asymmetry as it masks important day-to-day variation in prices.
Still, this leaves several open questions including why there are differences in the pass-through asymmetry across cities and between branded and unbranded wholesale gasoline. Research that has attempted to explain the asymmetry has focused on the demand side, with consumer search cost and inventory management by drivers being the leading explanations. Unless consumers vary across cities, supply-side factors could help explain the geographic variation.
In future work, I will focus on which supply-side characteristics are associated with Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (**) levels. Table 9 : F-Statistics, Unbranded Rack to Retail Prices (By Year) more or less asymmetric pass-through. These may include differences in the retail ownership structure (e.g., a larger percentage of lessee-dealer owned stations versus independents) similar to the study by Lewis (2009) and retail concentration similar to the study by Deltas (2008) . In addition, the results in this paper indicate that, at least in some cities, pass-through asymmetry varies over time. Supply-side shocks caused by hurricanes, pipeline disruptions, and refinery maintenance or outages, which only affect certain geographic areas and vary from year to year, may provide an explanation. 
